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Abstract
We introduce di®erent skill groups and production functions into the Burdett-
Mortensen equilibrium search model. Supermodularity in the production process
leads to a positive intra¯rm wage correlation between skill groups. Theory implies
that increasing returns to scale can lead to a unimodal earnings density with a
decreasing right tail even in the absence of productivity dispersion. Our empirical
results indicate economy-wide increasing returns to scale. We use the structural
estimates of the production parameters to investigate whether private returns to
education equal social returns. Our estimates suggest a positive welfare e®ect from
increasing the share of medium-skilled agents in the workforce.
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11. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the shape of the wage earnings distribution is determined by
the skill distribution of the work force, the production technologies used and the search
and matching frictions that govern the allocation of workers to jobs. The aim of this paper
is to provide a theoretical and still empirically tractable model that takes all these three
factors and their interactions into account. For doing so we extend the search equilibrium
model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) by introducing di®erent skill groups that are
linked via a production function which permits decreasing as well as increasing returns to
scale.
Since the endogenous wage distribution generated by the original Burdett-Mortensen
model has an upward-sloping density, which is at odds with the empirical observation
of a °at right tail, there has been a lot of e®ort to extend the original model in order
to generate a more realistically shaped wage distribution. In the present extension we
demonstrate that with skill multiplicity and a production function that permits any de-
gree of homogeneity we get a unimodal right-skewed wage o®er and earnings densities
with a decreasing right tail. Even though we later introduce productivity dispersion our
result about the shape of the wage o®er and earnings densities is true even for identical
employers.
Mortensen (1990) introduces di®erences in ¯rm productivity and Bowlus et al. (1995)
show that this greatly improves the ¯t to the empirical wage distribution. Bontemps et
al. (2000) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a con-
tinuous atomless productivity distribution which translates into a wage earnings density
with a decreasing right tail. Bontemps et al. (1999) extend this for both employer and
worker heterogeneity. While the structural models with continuous productivity disper-
sion as suggested by Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
improve the ¯t to the empirical wage earnings distribution and provide reliable estimates
of the labor market transition rates, they are not informative about the production pa-
rameters governing the productivity dispersion (see Manning, 2003, p.106f). In this paper
di®erent production technologies are explicitly introduced. This allows us to estimate the
technology parameters which determine the form of the productivity dispersion.
With the introduction of technology parameters we achieve not only a much more
realistic shape of the earnings distribution we also open another dimension in the ap-
plication of empirical equilibrium search models, making it possible to study the impact
2that a marginal shift in the skill structure of an economy has on the output as well as on
the wage o®er and wage earnings distribution. The information contained in technology
parameters enables us to evaluate the private and social returns to acquiring a speci¯c
skill level and, thus, to investigate whether there is over- or underinvestment into human
capital in the economy. In particular, we seek to answer the question whether an increase
in output resulting from educating an individual one skill level up would be higher than
the private return to the investment in education of the marginal individual. In the em-
pirical part of the paper we estimate the model to answer this question for Germany. We
¯nd that a marginal change in the skill structure of the labor force away from low-skilled
and towards more medium-skilled workers does indeed generate an increase in output
su±cient to overcompensate the society for the additional cost of educating the marginal
individual. At the same time, the number of high-skilled workers is found to be close to
the socially e±cient level.
The underinvestment result can be explained by the work of Acemoglu (1996) and
Masters (1998) who show in an undirected search and matching model that individuals
will underinvest in skills, since matching frictions and bargaining make it impossible to
capture the whole return to the investment. This underinvestment result rests on the
assumption that both types of worker search in the same market. If workers of di®erent
skills search in segmented markets both over- and underinvestment in education is possible
as shown by Saint-Paul (1996). The reason is that a lower unemployment rate among
high skilled workers can increase the return to human capital investment to such a degree
that the negative e®ect of search frictions is more than o®set.1 In our model markets are
segmented according to skills and hence both over- and underinvestment is possible.
The analysis of di®erent groups of individuals that are segmented into di®erent labor
markets is related to the work by Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). Within the simple Burdett-
Mortensen model Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) analyze discrimination and skill di®erences
by allowing for di®erent productivity and di®erent transition parameters across races as
well as incorporating employers discrimination. Unlike Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), in
this paper we rather focus on how the interaction of di®erent skill groups in the production
process in°uences the determination the marginal product and the wage distribution of the
each skill group. Furthermore, along with productivity di®erences, we consider di®erences
in the values of the labor market states across the skill groups.
1Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the hold-up problem can be overcome if workers are able to
direct their search to potentially di®erent markets.
3In the theoretical part of the paper we also demonstrate that whenever skills are com-
plementary in the production process we should observe a positive within-¯rm correlation
between the wages of workers with di®erent skills. Positive intra¯rm wage correlation is
a well established empirical fact, evidence of which are presented in Katz and Summers
(1989) and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003). The result of a positive wage correlation is the
key for the derivation of a closed form solution for the skill-speci¯c wage o®er distribution
which allows us to structurally estimate the model.
The estimation methodology applied in this paper is based on the one considered in
Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001). Skill-multiplicity and the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion used in the econometric model imply identities that allow representing the subset of
production parameters as a function of the search frictions parameters and the degree of
homogeneity the Cobb-Douglas technology. With the introduction of heterogeneous tech-
nologies, skill multiplicity also invokes the identi¯ability restrictions that link production
parameters to the kink points (\cuto® wages") of the wage o®er distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. The theory is presented in Section 2, where we extend
the existing Burdett-Mortensen framework, solve for optimal strategies of workers and
¯rms and discuss the properties of the resulting equilibrium wage o®er distribution. The
empirical implementation of the model is treated in Section 3. We consider the appropriate
likelihood function and discuss the relevant estimation method and identi¯ability issues.
Thereafter, in Section 4, we provide a brief description of the data set and in detail discuss
the result of the structural estimation of the model and present our results about social
and private returns to education. Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORY
In this section we extend the original Burdett-Mortensen model of search equilibrium by
introducing di®erent skill groups and di®erent technologies. This allows for the marginal
product of a skill group in a particular ¯rm to depend not only on the technology used
but also on the skill structure employed in a ¯rm and the size of the ¯rm.
2.1 Framework
The model has an in¯nite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady
states. Workers are risk neutral and discount at rate r. Before entering the labor market
each worker has to decide which skill i = 1;2;:::;I he wants to acquire. The skill levels
4are ranked from the lowest i = 1 to the highest i = I. The cost to acquire a speci¯c
skill-level i di®ers for each worker. By assuming perfect capital markets, workers are
able to borrow the cost of education. We assume that the one-o® cost ci;a=r can be
described by an inverse relationship between a skill speci¯c cost component ci that is
increasing in i and an individual's ability a, i.e. ci;a = ci=a. Ability is distributed according
to a continuous distribution function H (a) with support a 2 [a;a] with a > 0. This
assumption is important for the investigation of whether there is over- or underinvestment
in the economy, since it guarantees that the cost ranking of all individuals is the same
across skill groups. Although ability in°uences the cost of acquiring a speci¯c skill-level,
we assume that it does not in°uence the productivity at the work place.2 For the labor
market analysis we take the individuals' education decision as given and return to it in
section 4.3 where we investigate the question of social returns to education. Given the
education choice made, an individual belongs to a skill group i = 1;2;:::;I whose measures
are denoted as qi, satisfying
P
qi = m. The measure ui of workers is unemployed and the
measure qi ¡ ui is employed.
Workers search for a job in the skill-segmented labor markets. Unemployed workers
of skill group i encounter a ¯rm that makes them a wage o®er corresponding to their
education at a Poisson rate ¸i. Employed workers encounter another ¯rm at a Poisson
rate ¸e.3 Then workers decide whether to accept or reject the job o®er. A job-worker
match is destroyed at an exogenous rate ± > 0. Laid o® workers start again as unemployed.
We assume that there exist J distinct production technologies Yj (l(w j wr;F (w))) in-
dexed by j = 1;2;:::;J, where l(w j wr;F (w)) is the vector of skill groups li (w j wr
i;Fi (w))
employed by a ¯rm with technology j. The size li (w j wr
i;Fi (w)) of the skill group de-
pends on the ¯rm's wage o®er wi, the workers' reservation wage wr
i and the skill spe-
ci¯c wage o®er distribution Fi(w). We further assume that the production function
Yj (l(w j wr;F (w))) is supermodular in l(w j wr;F (w)), i.e. that labor inputs are com-
plements. Restriction to supermodular production functions is justi¯ed later on, when we
2This assumption is clearly restrictive. However, as the number of skill groups increases this assump-
tion becomes less and less restrictive, since workers with a higher ability chose a higher skill level, where
they are more productive.
3¸e is assumed to be the same across all skill groups, because otherwise we would not be able to
derive an explicit solution for the wage o®er distribution function. Assuming a constant probability of
encountering another ¯rm across di®erent skill groups is equivalent of assuming that the mean employment
spell in a job is the same for all skill groups. Fortunately, our data shows only minor di®erences in the
employment spells across skill groups (see Table 1).
5use this property to establish Proposition 1.
De¯nition 1: For any l ´ l(w j wr;F (w)) and l0´ l
0 (w j wr;F (w)), Yj (l) is supermod-
ular in l, if
Yj (l^l
0) + Yj (l_l
0) ¸ Yj (l) + Yj (l
0),
where l_l0 ´ (max(l1;l0
1);:::;max(lI;l0
I)) and l^l0 ´ (min(l1;l0
1);:::;min(lI;l0
I)).
2.2 Workers' Search Strategy
As shown by Mortensen and Neumann (1988) the optimal search strategy for a worker of
occupation i is characterized by a reservation wage wr
i, where an unemployed worker is
indi®erent between accepting or rejecting a wage o®er, i.e. Ui = Vi(wr
i). Ui is the value
of being unemployed and Vi(wr
i) the value of being employed at the reservation wage wr
i.





(Vi(xi) ¡ Ui)dFi(xi) ¡ ci;a, (1a)
rVi(wi) = wi + ¸e
Z ¹ wi
wi
(Vi(xi) ¡ Vi(wi))dFi(xi) + ± (Ui ¡ Vi(wi)) ¡ ci;a (1b)
respectively. They can be solved for the reservation wage4
w
r






r + ± + ¸e(1 ¡ Fi(x¡))
¶
dx. (2)
The wage o®er distribution is given by Fi(w) = Fi(w¡) + Ài(w), where Ài(w) is the mass
of ¯rms o®ering wage w to skill group i. Since o®ering a wage lower than the reservation
wage does not attract any worker, we assume with out loss of generality that no ¯rm
o®ers a wage below the reservation wage, i.e. Fi (w) = 0 for w < wr
i.
2.3 Steady State Flows and Skill Group Size
Equating the °ows in and out of unemployment gives the steady state measure of unem-





Given the assumption of constant Poisson arrival and separation rates Mortensen (1999)
has shown that skill group size evolves according to a special Markov-chain known as
stochastic birth-death process. The birth rate of a job o®ered by a ¯rm posting a wage w
4The details of the derivation can be found in Mortensen and Neumann (1988).
6is given by the average rate at which a job is ¯lled. There are ui unemployed who leave
unemployment at rate ¸i and (qi¡ui) employed workers who leave their current employer
at rate ¸eGi(w¡) to join the ¯rm o®ering a wage w, where Gi(w) = Gi(w¡)+#i(w) denotes
the cumulative wage earnings distribution for skill group i. A worker-employer pair splits
at rate ±. Moreover, a worker may receive a higher wage o®er from another ¯rm, which
occurs at rate ¸e, and accepts it, which happens with probability F i(w) ´ (1 ¡ Fi(w)).
The death rate of a job is, therefore, given by ± +¸eF i(w). Mortensen (1999) shows that
the skill group size is Poisson distributed with mean
E [li (w j w
r
i;Fi (w))] =
¸iui + ¸eGi(w¡)(qi ¡ ui)
± + ¸eF i(w)
.
Equating the in°ow and out°ow gives the steady-state measure of employed workers
earning a wage less than w
Gi(w
¡)(qi ¡ ui) =
¸iFi(w¡)ui
± + ¸eF i(w¡)
. (4)
Substituting gives
E [li (w j w
r
i;Fi (w))] =
±¸i (± + ¸e)=(± + ¸i)
£
± + ¸eF i(w)
¤£
± + ¸eF i(w¡)
¤qi, (5)
From (5) it follows that the expected skill group size E [li (w j wr
i;Fi (w))] is (i) increasing
in w, if w ¸ wr
i, (ii) continuous except where Fi (w) has a mass point and is (iii) strictly
increasing on the support of Fi (w) and constant on any connected interval o® the support
of Fi (w). The intuition behind this result is that on-the-job search implies that the higher
the wage o®ered by a ¯rm is, the more employed workers are attracted from ¯rms o®ering
lower wages and the less workers quit to employers paying higher wages. This leads
to a higher steady-state skill group size for ¯rms o®ering higher wages. For notational
simplicity, from now on we use li (w) instead of li (w j wr
i;Fi (w)).
2.4 Wage Posting
The foregoing analysis is identical to the Burdett-Mortensen model with an index i for
each skill group. The following analysis of the ¯rms' wage posting behavior di®ers from
previous work, since the interdependence of the skill groups in the production process
implies that it is no longer optimal to post the wage for one skill group independently
from the wages posted for other skill groups.
7Each ¯rm posts a wage schedule w in order to maximize its pro¯t, taking as given the
workers' search strategy, i.e. the reservation wage vector wr, and the other ¯rms' wage









Firms form expectations over all possible realizations of the di®erent skill group sizes
li (w j wr
i;Fi (w)) given a ¯rm's choice of the wage schedule and the birth-death process
characterized above. Hence, a ¯rm may choose to adjust its wage policy according to
the realizations of the di®erent skill group sizes li (w j wr
i;Fi (w)). Since this problem
is intractable, we assume that a ¯rm can specify its wage policy w only once, which
is equivalent of assuming that ¯rms commit to a certain position within the wage o®er
distribution of each skill group. Firms might for instance commit to paying the same
wage to all new recruits, because they face a concern for "fairness" and "equality" on
part of the workers.
Given this assumption and the fact that the birth-death process governing the hiring
and quitting behavior of workers of one skill group is statistically independent from the
birth-death process for another skill group we can write the maximization problem of a








if we take a second order Taylor expansion to approximate the production function.5
Denote by Wj the set of wage o®ers that maximize equation (6), i.e. Wj = argmax
w
¼j,
and the corresponding I-dimensional wage o®er distribution for each ¯rm type j by
Fj (w) = (F1j(w);F2j(w);:::;FIj(w)), where Fij(w) denotes the wage o®er distribution
of type j ¯rms for skill group i.
De¯nition 2: A steady state wage posting equilibrium is a wage o®er distribution Fj (w)
5Take the second order Taylor expansion around a vector r of skill group sizes, i.e.
E [Y (l(w))] = E [Y (r)] +
X
i





Y¶ ¶(r)E [(li (w) ¡ ri)(ll (w) ¡ rl)]
= E [Y (r)] +
X
i





Y¶ ¶(r)(E [li (w)] ¡ ri)(E [ll (w)] ¡ rl)
= Y (E [l(w)]),
where the second equality follows from the independence of the skill speci¯c hiring and quitting processes.
8with w 2 Wj for each ¯rm type j 2 J such that
¼j = Yj (E [l(w)]) ¡ w
TE [l(w)] for all w on the support of Fj (w), (7)
¼j ¸ Yj (E [l(w)]) ¡ w
TE [l(w)] otherwise,
given the reservation wage wr
i for each skill group i = 1;2;:::;I and a corresponding skill
group wage o®er distribution Fi (w) such that the reservation wage wr
i satis¯es equation
(2) given Fi (w).
2.5 Properties of the Wage O®er Distribution
Following Mortensen (1990) we next describe the properties of the aggregate and the skill
speci¯c wage o®er distributions.
From the supermodularity property of the production function and the fact that the
expected skill group size given in equation (5) is increasing in w and upper semi-continuous
it follows that pro¯ts ¼j are supermodular in wi. Thus, a ¯rm paying higher wages for
one skill group also pays higher wages for another skill group.
Proposition 1 Take a ¯rm of type j 2 [1;J] o®ering w 2 Wj and another ¯rm of type
j o®ering w0 2 Wj, where w and w0 ¸ wr, then either w ¸ w0 or w · w0.
Proof. For any w and w0 ¸ wr, ¼j (wi;w¡i) (where ¡i denotes the vector of all skill


























because the same inequality holds for output Yj (E [l(wi;w¡i)]) and the wage cost cancel
out.
Now, we prove w ¸ w0 by contradiction. For any w and w02 Wj with wi > w0
i, suppose
w¡i < w0
¡i. The following chain of inequalities results in the desired contradiction.

























The ¯rst and the last inequality result from optimality of w and w0, the second inequality
comes from the supermodularity shown above.
Evidence for this positive correlation between the wages of workers in di®erent skill
groups within ¯rms was found by Katz and Summers (1989), who show evidence that
9secretaries earn more in ¯rms where average wages are higher. More recently, Barth and
Dale-Olsen (2003) ¯nd that \high-wage establishments for workers with higher education
are high-wage establishments for workers with lower education as well". The explanation
provided for this empirical observation in this paper rests on two pillars. Firstly, for each
skill group the labor supply curve is upward sloping given the wage o®er distribution is
dispersed, which can be seen from equation (5). Secondly, the complementarity of skills
in the production process guarantees that increasing both labor inputs simultaneously is
optimal. The empirical regularity mentioned above justi¯es our choice of the production
function, where labor inputs are complements.
Given that the skill group size is increasing in the wage wi, it would be suboptimal if
the support of the wage o®er distributions was not a compact set.
Proposition 2 The support of each skill speci¯c wage o®er distribution Fi (w) is closed
and connected, i.e. supp(Fi) = [wr
i;wi].
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. no ¯rms o®er a wage wi 2 (w¤
i;w¤¤
i ) ½ [wr
i;wi]. This
cannot be pro¯t maximizing, since the ¯rm o®ering w¤¤
i can o®er lim"!0 (w¤
i + "), have
the same skill group size, i.e. li (w¤¤
i j wr
i;Fi (w¤¤
i )) = lim"!0 li ((w¤
i + ") j wr
i;Fi (w¤
i + ")),
since lim"!0 Fi (w¤
i + ") = Fi (w¤¤
i ), and can thus make higher pro¯t. Thus, the support
of the wage o®er distribution is connected. By the same argument wr
i is part of the
support. The equal pro¯t condition (7) together with the equation for the skill group size
(5) implies that the support is also closed at the upper end.
Firms with di®erent technologies j make potentially di®erent pro¯ts ¼j in equilibrium.
We index the technologies according to their pro¯tability, i.e. ¼j ¸ ¼j¡18j = 1;2;:::;J.
The next proposition shows that for any skill group i more pro¯table ¯rms pay higher
wages.









the I-dimensional wage o®er distributions of j and j ¡ 1-type ¯rms respectively. Then,
for any wage schedule wj 2 [wr;w] and wj¡1 2 [wr;w] it is true that wj ¸ wj¡1.
Proof. From the steady state equilibrium condition (7) it follows that:
¼j = Yj (E [l(wj)]) ¡ w
T
j E [l(wj)] 8wj 2 supp(Fj)
¼j ¸ Yj (E [l(wj¡1)]) ¡ w
T
j¡1E [l(wj¡1)] 8wj¡1 = 2 supp(Fj)
10Using the result above we can write
¼j = Yj(E [l(wj)]) ¡ w
T
j E [l(wj)] ¸ Yj(E [l(wj¡1)]) ¡ w
T
j¡1E [l(wj¡1)]
¸ Yj¡1(E [l(wj¡1)]) ¡ w
T
j¡1E [l(wj¡1)] = ¼j¡1 ¸ Yj¡1(E [l(wj)]) ¡ w
T
j E [l(wj)],
where the second inequality results from the fact that ¼j ¸ ¼j¡1.
The di®erence of the ¯rst and the last terms in this inequality is greater than or equal to
the di®erence of its middle terms, i.e Yj(E [l(wj)])¡Yj¡1(E [l(wj)]) ¸ Yj(E [l(wj¡1)])¡
Yj¡1(E [l(wj¡1)]). Since l(w) is an increasing function of wages w, the claim follows.
To be able to identify a particular technology in the empirical estimation, we assume that
technologies strictly dominate each other by pro¯ts, i.e. ¼j > ¼j¡1. Since Proposition
2 holds true for any wage pair wj;wj¡1 and thus also for wj = inf (wj) and wj¡1 =
sup(wj¡1), it follows that wj ¸ wj¡1. Thus, the more productive ¯rms with technology
j pay higher wages for all skill groups.
Furthermore, let °j denote the cumulative measure of technology j with °j > °j¡1 > 0
8j = 1;2;:::;J and °J = 1. Thus, Proposition 3 implies that the fraction of ¯rms with
technologies earning pro¯t ¼j or less post wages wj or below. Thus, for every skill group
i the wage o®er distribution at wijis given by °j, i.e.
Fi (wij) = °j (8)
The next proposition shows under which condition it is not optimal for a type j ¯rm
to o®er the same wage wi as a mass of other type j ¯rms does.
Proposition 4 The wage o®er distributions Fi (wi) of type j ¯rms for skill group i is
continuous, if
Yj [E [li (wi j w
r


















E [li (wi j w
r




















= °j ¡ Ài (wij).
If the marginal product at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi) exceeds wij, i.e.
@Yj [E [l(w)]]
@E [li (wij j wr
i;°j)]
> wij, (10)
then a mass point can be ruled out.




¼j (wi + ";w¡i) + w
T
¡iE [l(w¡i)]
= Yj [E [li (wi j w
r




































i ) = Ài(wi) > 0. If the above inequality holds, no mass point can exist
at wi.
To show that a mass point can only exist at the upper bound of the support of Fi (wi)











¢E [li (wi)] = 0,





















































. Since equation (5) together with Propo-





¢E [li (wi)]=¢wi > 0, this expression is positive if and only if inequality (11) holds, i.e.
only if no mass point exists. Thus, a mass point cannot exist in the interior of the support






= °j ¡ Ài (wij).






= °j ¡ Ài (wij) gives













































@E [li (wij j wr
i;°j)]
.
12The basic argument as to why the wage o®er distributions can be continuous is given by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). If all ¯rms o®er the same wage for one skill group, then
individual ¯rms could attract a signi¯cantly larger expected skill group size by o®ering a
slightly higher wage. This wage increase can be arbitrarily small, whereas the resulting
increase in the skill group size is signi¯cant, since all workers currently working for the
\mass-point" wage will change to the new employer as soon as they get this higher wage
o®er. The deviation from a mass point is, thus, pro¯table if the increase in total output
induced by a slight wage increase is higher than the increase in total wage cost. This is
stated by the condition (9) in Proposition 4.
In order to be able to derive an explicit solution for the wage o®er distribution, we
continue under the assumption that no mass points exist. If all wage o®er distributions
are continuous, then an immediate result of Proposition 1 is that a ¯rm occupies the
same position in the wage o®er distribution of every skill group. To formalize this, let us
introduce an index k which orders the ¯rms of type j as they increase their wage o®er for
skill group i. Then Proposition 1 implies that for all w 2 Wj
F
k
ij (w) = F
k
lj (w) for all i;l = 1;2;:::;I. (12)
To be able to use the above property, let us de¯ne
E [li (w j w
r
i;Fi (wi))] ´ rijhj (w),
where
hj (w) =
[± + ¸e (1 ¡ °j¡1)]
2
£
± + ¸eF j (w)
¤£
± + ¸eF j (w¡)
¤, rij =
± (± + ¸e)¸i=(± + ¸i)
[± + ¸e (1 ¡ °j¡1)]
2 qi.
The fact that hj (w) depends only on the position the ¯rm takes in the wage o®er distri-
bution, i.e. on Fj (w), implies that hj (w) does not depend on any skill speci¯c parameter.
Additionally we approximate the production technology j by using a second order Taylor
expansion around the minimum wage wij that ¯rms with technology j post. Given a
technology Yj (rj) homogeneous of degree »j, the Taylor Expansion is given by





















rljrij = (»j ¡ 1)Y
0
j (rj)rij.
13We use the results of Propositions 1-4, invoke the equal pro¯t condition ¼j = ¼r
j, apply
the Taylor Expansion and use the ¯rst order condition to derive the skill-speci¯c wage
o®er distribution. Proposition 5 provides the solution for Fi(wi) as a function of wi.
Proposition 5 Assume that the production functions Yj (E [l(w)]) 8j = 1;2;:::;J are
supermodular and that no mass point exists. Then a unique equilibrium wage o®er distri-
bution Fij(wi) for each skill group i = 1;2;:::;I exists and has the following form









j (rj) ¡ wi
Y 0
j (rj) ¡ wij
, (13)






























¡ wi > 0: (15)
Proof. See Appendix.














The comparative statics results of the original Burdett-Mortensen model are valid for
the above aggregate wage o®er distribution function as well. If the arrival rate of on-
the-job o®ers, i.e. ¸e, goes to zero, then the wage o®er distribution Fi(w) collapses to
6A special case for Fij(wi) when
¡
Y 0
j (rj) ¡ wij
¢
rij = ¹ij is shown in the proof of Proposition 5. Since
it implies arti¯cial restrictions on »j considering this case here is neither interesting nor useful.
14a mass point at the reservation wage wr
i, which equals the Diamond (1971) monopsony
solution. If moving from one job to another becomes very easy, i.e. ¸e goes to in¯nity,
the competition among ¯rms drives wages up and the wage earnings distribution Gi(w)
converges to a mass point at the marginal product of the skill group.
For a production function with homogeneity of degree one, the explicit wage o®er
distribution resembles the distribution derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and has
its typical increasing density. As an upward-sloping earnings density is at odds with
the empirically observed decreasing right tail, Mortensen (1990) introduces di®erences in
¯rm productivity by allowing for di®erent productivity levels in order to improve the ¯t
to the empirical wage earnings distribution. Bowlus et al. (1995) demonstrate that this
greatly improves the ¯t to the empirical earnings distribution. Bontemps et al. (2000) and
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulate a closed-form solution for a continuous atomless
productivity distribution, which translates into a right-tailed wage earnings distribution.7
The novelty of this paper is that the wage o®er distribution given in Proposition 5 can
have an increasing and a decreasing density for a given production technology. Although
we allow for the possibility that heterogeneous production technologies are used, we do
not need any technology dispersion to get a hump-shaped density. As stated in condition
(15) only technologies with homogeneity of degree 2 > »j can have an increasing density.
Notice further that as the wage w increases, condition (15) is more likely to be violated
implying that the wage o®er density can have an upward sloping part for small wages and
an downward sloping part for large wages.
The reason why increasing returns to scale can bend the wage o®er density in such a
way that it depicts a decreasing right tail, is the equal pro¯t condition. Let us focus on the
case with a homogenous production function with increasing returns to scale, i.e. »j > 1
and compare it to an economy with constant returns to scale, where the marginal product
of ¯rms o®ering the reservation wage schedule are equivalent in both environments. Hence
equilibrium pro¯ts are the same in both economies. First note that the skill group size
and thus output is determined solely by the ¯rm's position in the wage o®er distribution.
Consider now two ¯rms sitting at the same position of the wage o®er distribution, one
with constant returns to scale the other with increasing returns to scale. Since the output
of the ¯rm with increasing returns is higher than the output of the ¯rm with constant
returns, the ¯rm with increasing returns to scale has to pay higher wages due to the
7However, tail behavior of the productivity density, hence o®er and earnings densities, in this case is
subject to additional restrictions (see Bontemps et al., 2000; Proposition 8).
15equal pro¯t condition. Thus, the larger the returns to scale are, the larger is the wage
di®erence paid by \neighboring" ¯rms at the upper end of the wage o®er distribution.
Or, in other words, in an economy with increasing returns to scale the relative mass of
¯rms sitting on a ¯xed interval decreases the closer we get to the upper bound. This
mechanism eventually leads to a downward-sloping wage o®er density in an economy with
high enough returns to scale.
Remarkable enough, Mortensen (2000) also implicitly restricts his analysis to produc-
tion functions with increasing returns to scale when deriving endogenously the employer
heterogeneity based on match speci¯c capital. He assumes that the production technology
has constant returns with respect to labor but increasing economies of scale due to the
capital k employed by the ¯rm, i.e. Y (l(w)) = k®l(w), where ® > 0. By simulation he
shows that for positive ® the wage o®er distribution has a °at right tail.
Finally, consider the equilibrium earnings density gij(wi). From (15) follows that
»j > 2 is a su±cient condition for fij(wi) to have a decreasing right tail. The tail of the
density function de¯ned on [wi1;wiJ] converges to zero at the fastest possible rate (see
Bontemps et al., 2000, proof of Proposition 8). However letting wiJ go to in¯nity we get
the following result for the behavior of the earnings density function.
Proposition 6 Let wiJ ! 1. Under the su±cient condition for a decreasing right tail
of fiJ(wi) the right tail of the equilibrium earnings density giJ(wi) converges at a rate
faster than w¡2. Speed of convergence is a power law that positively depends on the degree
of homogeneity of the production function.
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Finally, representing the su±cient condition for the decreasing right tail of the fiJ(wi)








The result of Proposition 6 implies that the right tail of the equilibrium earnings density
encompasses the families of Pareto and Singh-Maddala distributions, which are acknowl-
edged to have the best ¯t to the observed high-earnings data.8 This result, as in Bontemps
et al. (2000), also excludes the distributions with exponential speed of convergence, e.g.
lognormal, from the set of possible candidates for the equilibrium earnings distribution.
Finally, allowing for the increasing returns of the production function, we extend the re-
sult of Proposition 8 in Bontemps et al. (2000), demonstrating that the earnings density
can converge both slower and faster then w¡3.
3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Now we consider the structural econometric model based on the theory presented above.






with homogeneity of degree »j =
P
i ®ij, ®ij > 0. The model is estimated by maximum
likelihood using the methodology that builds on Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001).
3.1 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function is constructed along the lines of van den Berg and Ridder (1998).
For a Poisson process with rate µ, the joint distribution of the elapsed (te) and residual (tr)
8See Singh and Maddala (1976). Additionally, McDonald (1984) shows that Singh-Maddala distribu-
tion outperforms the majority of the generalizations of the conventional earnings distributions.
17duration of time spent by an individual in a certain state of the labor market is f(te;tr) =
µ2e¡µ(te+tr). For an individual that belongs to the i-th skill group the appropriate Poisson
rates are ¸i if the person is unemployed and ± + ¸e [1 ¡ Fi(wi)] if the person is employed
at wage wi. Furthermore:
² For the unemployed: The equilibrium probability of sampling an unemployed agent
who belongs to i-th skill group is m¡1qi±=(± + ¸i). In case the subsequent job
transition is observed, we know the o®ered wage and can record the value of the
wage o®er density fi(wi).
² For the employed: The equilibrium probability of sampling an agent who belongs to
i-th skill group and earns wage wi is m¡1qigi(wi)¸i=(± + ¸i). In case the transition
to the next state is observed, we record the destination state. The probabilities of
exit to unemployment and to next job are ½j!u = ±=
¡





± + ¸eF i (wi)
¢
, respectively.
For convenience of the estimation we de¯ne ·i = ¸i=± , ·e = ¸e=± . Then the likelihood



























In (17) and (18) dl = 1 if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise; dr = 1 if a spell is right-
censored, 0 otherwise; dt = 1 if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise. Substitution
of the appropriate gi (wi), fi(wi) and Fi(wi) into (17) and (18), where gi(wi) is obtained
from Fi(wi) using (4), completes the formulation of the likelihood function.
Notice that the individual contributions (17) and (18) are the same as in Bowlus et
al. (1995, 2001) except of the probability terms m¡1qi=(1 + ·i) and m¡1qi·i=(1 + ·i).
Though, the main di®erences of our model are driven by the functional forms of the o®er
and earnings distributions.
3.2 Homogeneous Firms
It is instructive to start with the model with no productivity dispersion, since the theory
18allows obtaining an earnings density with a decreasing right tail even with homogeneous
employers. This density will have I ¡ 1 jumps at in¯mum wages and I ¡ 1 spikes at
supremum wages of each skill group.
Consider the unknowns of the econometric model. The skill measures fqig
I
i=1 are
known from the data and given by the sample sizes of each skill group. Furthermore, to
avoid bounds of the likelihood function depending on the parameters, Kiefer and Neumann
(1993) justify using the extreme order statistics fmin(wi);max(wi)g as the consistent es-
timates for wi and wi respectively. Under employer homogeneity the assumed production
function modi¯es to Y (l(w)) = p
QI
l=1 ll(w)®l. The functional form of the wage o®er




mFi(wi), where Fi(wi) is given
in Proposition 5 with J = 1 and ·i;e = ¸i;e=± . Recognizing that Fi(wi) = 1 and using






















where ´ ´ (1 + ·e)
¡2.
Since (19) holds for any i one can represent any ®i as a function of » and the rest of





» (» ¡ 1)(1 + ´)rl









Without loss of generality setting i = 1, l = 2;:::;I and recognizing that ®1 = » ¡
PI
k=2 ®k; we get a system of I ¡ 1 linear equations, which gives a unique solution for













uniquely identi¯ed from the duration data irrespective of the functional form of the o®er
distribution (e.g. Koning et al., 1995), it follows that the production size » is uniquely
identi¯ed from the labor costs data.
3.3 Heterogeneous Firms
Production functions for heterogeneous employers are given in (16). The relevant occupation-
speci¯c wage o®er distribution Fi(w) is provided in Proposition 5. Rewritten in ·i;e terms,
9Use equation (A.3) in the appendix with Fi(wi) = 1, ¾i = ®i (» ¡ 1)Y (r) and Y¶(r)=ri = ®iY (r)
for the derivation.
10To see this it is su±cient to rewrite the system in the matrix form. The matrix to be inverted will
have a particular structure that never allows one row to be a linear combination of the others because
wl¡´wl





















·i=(1 + ·i)(1 + ·e)


















for all wi 2 [wij;wij], i = 1;:::;I and j = 1;:::;J.
Remembering that °j = Fi(wij), we can use (16) and (20) to derive the productivity






















where ´j = [(1 + ·e[1 ¡ °j])=(1 + ·e[1 ¡ °j¡1])]
2.
Consider the unknowns of the econometric model with heterogeneous ¯rms. As before,
skill group size and group-speci¯c bounds for the o®er distributions are available from the
data. At the same time there appears an additional set of unknown cuto® wages fwijg
I;J¡1
i;j=1
for the ¯rm-speci¯c wage o®er. Unlike in the homogeneous model, the existence of the
unknown cuto® wages does not allow us to use equation (21) to write down ®ij as a
function of exclusively »j and frictions parameters. However, knowing that wij = wij¡1
provides us with additional cross-restrictions on pj¡1 and pj. Using these cross-restrictions





i;j=1 are completely determined by (21), two representations of the
model are possible:
1. Cuto® wages fwijg
I;J¡1
i;j=1 can be expressed as a function of production parameters
f®ijg
I¡1;J










2. Production parameters f®ijg
I¡1;J
i;j=1 can be expressed as a function of cuto® wages
fwijg
I;J¡1










20Irrespective of the choice of the parameter subset to be substituted out, (21) implies
that there exist J(I ¡ 1) independent equations that completely determine cuto® wages




i;j=1 appear outside the
system of these equations. Moreover, for I skill groups there exist (J ¡ 1)I unknown
production parameters and J(I ¡ 1) unknown cuto® wages. Since both representations
must be equivalent to each other, we conclude that the parameters cannot be identi¯ed
whenever J(I ¡ 1) 6= (J ¡ 1)I. From this follows that I = J symmetry is a necessary
condition for identi¯cation of the model with employer heterogeneity.
Although both speci¯cations are equally possible, expressing cuto® wages as a function
of the rest of the parameters is a strictly dominated one because cuto® wages are the
discontinuity points of the likelihood function. Thus, substituting them with known
functions of the rest of the parameters means that no gradient-based methods can be
used to estimate the model. Even though derivative-free methods are available, a serious
problem may appear when the assumption of no mass points in the o®er distribution
stated in Proposition 4 becomes a binding restriction. We therefore choose the second
way to represent the model. Equation (21) then implies that for any i;l = 1;::;I the










»j (»j ¡ 1)(1 + ´j)rlj









This gives rise to a system of J(I¡1) linear equations with J(I¡1) unknown cuto® wages.
It is also easy to see that for J = 1 the above identity reduces to the one described in the
previous subsection. Rewriting the implied system in a matrix form, one can ¯nd that the
matrix to be inverted is block-diagonal. Each and every block in it has the same structure
as the matrix of a corresponding problem in section 3.2, out of which invertability follows.
The unique solution for f®ijg
I¡1;J
i;j=1 reduces the parameter space to the subset of the
location parameters of the discontinuity points of the likelihood function fwijg
I;J¡1
i;j=1 and








. Chernozhukov and Hong
(2004) demonstrate that in the considered class of models shape and location parameters
are independent of each other. Thus conditional identi¯ability will imply joint identi¯a-
bility of the both. Within the subset of shape parameters search frictions are uniquely
identi¯ed using the duration data. From this follows that production sizes are uniquely
identi¯ed from the labor costs data.
The above representation of the model ¯ts into a convenient stepwise estimation strat-
21egy developed by Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001). At the ¯rst step, given the starting values
for the structural parameters, cuto® wages are estimated by simulated annealing. At the
second step, given the estimates of the cuto® wages, the likelihood function is maximized
with respect to µ. The second step is a \smooth" optimization and can be e±ciently
executed using gradient-based methods. Substituting the estimates from both steps into
(4) and (8) we calculate the new point mass values °j





1 ¡ ^ Gi(wij)
1 + ·e ^ Gi(wij)
, (22)
where ^ Gi is a nonparametric estimate of the skill-speci¯c earnings distribution, and the
cycle repeats.
Provided that the maximum likelihood estimates satisfy the condition stated in Propo-
sition 4, we can apply the result of Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) who show that the










Furthermore, when the restriction of Proposition 4 is not binding, Chernozhukov and
Hong (2004) show that the bootstrap also consistently estimates the asymptotic covariance
matrix above.
3.4 Speci¯cation Check
We have derived the wage o®er distribution (14) under the assumption that all skill
speci¯c wage o®er distributions Fi (wi) are continuous. Consider an arbitrary skill group
l. Proposition 4 implies that the distribution function Fl (wl) is continuous if condition







The estimated parameters are consistent only when the model is properly speci¯ed, i.e.
when (24) holds. In case (24) is violated at the unconstrained maximum, constrained
MLE must be calculated.11
11One can also notice that with no skill di®erentiation, constant returns and identical employers, (24)
reduces to 1 > w=p implying continuous o®er distribution in the original Burdett-Mortensen model.
22Furthermore, the estimated parameters must be consistent with the assumption that
pro¯ts of the ¯rms with di®erent technologies are ranked, i.e.
0 · ¼j¡1 < ¼j. (25)
In conclusion, we also like to point out that whenever any of the above restrictions
is binding at the maximum the asymptotic covariance matrix of the ML estimator is no
longer given by (23) and the exact form of it is unknown. Moreover even in simpler models
with binding inequality constraints it is shown that bootstrap fails to consistently estimate
the covariance matrix of the true parameters (see Andrews, 2000, for a discussion). Given
that in the literature a consistent covariance matrix estimator for the cases where the
inequality restrictions are binding at the maximum (even for smooth likelihood functions)
has so far not been derived, we will present the con¯dence intervals using (23) to provide
the reader with at least rough information about the size of standard errors. Though,
when interpreting these con¯dence intervals, caution is necessary.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
4.1 The Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel { a longitudinal survey of German
households which was started at 1984 and conducted on the annual basis ever since. Our
sample contains information from the waves of 1984 to 2001. The analysis is restricted
to the working age population of native West Germans and major groups of foreigners
living in West Germany.
According to the theoretical model, we have only two states, namely \full time em-
ployment" and \unemployment". Since utility maximizing behavior of the representatives
of the other groups, such as part-time employed, self-employed or non-participants can
be di®erent from behavior of the individuals considered by the model, we exclude all the
agents who are neither full time employed nor unemployed from the sample (as in Koning
et al., 1995, and Bontemps et al., 2000).
To estimate the model we need information on both duration and wages. We get dura-
tion information by choosing a reference year and sampling all employed and unemployed
individuals at this year. After doing so, for each observation we track the individual
history backwards and forwards to restore the elapsed and residual duration of his/her
23staying in the current state of the market. Whenever a residual spell is complete, we
also record information about the exit state. Retrieving the duration lengths proceeds as
described in Bontemps et al. (2000). The reference year is set to 1995.
Unlike in the rest of empirical equilibrium search models, when collecting the wage
data we di®erentiate between net wage received by the worker and labor costs to the ¯rm.
In the theoretical model we have two sets of parameters, namely workers' search intensities
and production parameters. Since the theory states that reservation wage and labor size
depend on just the position of the ¯rm in the wage o®er distribution, frictional parameters
can be estimated using any of these two types of earnings data, since the ordering of the
¯rms does not change by taking labor costs instead of net wages. For identi¯cation of the
production parameters, to the contrary, labor costs are crucial because the magnitude of
the costs of production in°uences the size of estimated factor elasticities. Therefore the
labour costs and not net wages are used for the estimation.
GSOEP provides the data on both net and gross wages. Individuals who are employed
at their interview provide the earnings information of one month prior to the interview.
For the unemployed we use the ¯rst reported wage after the end of unemployment, pro-
vided that the transition to the job is observed. All wages are de°ated by the West
German consumer price index at prices of 1998. Labor costs are de¯ned as the sum of
gross wage and ¯rms' contributions to the employees' social security payments. Infor-
mation on the latter is available, for instance, form the publications of the Federation of
German Pension Insurance Institutes (\Verband Deutscher RentenversicherungstrÄ ager";
see VDR, 2004, p.243, 245).
In our application we estimate the model with three di®erent productivity levels and
three di®erent skill groups. Skill strati¯cation of the sample is performed on the basis of
the International Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED) of 1997.
We de¯ne as \low- skilled" all individuals who have inadequate or general elementary
training, i.e. codes \1" and \2". Individuals with middle vocational training, i.e. code
\3", represent the \medium-skilled" group. Finally, as \high-skilled" we qualify all those
with higher vocational training, university education etc, i.e. codes \4" to \6".
A summary of duration and wage data is presented in Tables 1 and 2 both for full
sample and distinct skill groups. Skill di®erentiation re°ects such basic facts about less
skilled in comparison to higher skilled as higher level of unemployment, higher rate of
job loss, longer unemployment duration. Additionally net wages and labor costs are
summarized by kernel density plots (see Figures A.1-2 in the Appendix). As expected,
24Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Event History Data ¤
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Number of individuals 898 1931 1062 3891
Employed 746 1786 1025 3557
Unemployed 152 145 37 334
Employed Agents
Uncensored observations with
job ! job transition 49 187 178 414
job ! unemployment transition 98 126 41 256
Mean time spell between two states [job duration] 129.639 109.815 89.566 107.576
(std. deviation) (114.92) (102.14) (85.42) (101.01)
Censored observations
a) Left-censored durations only
with job ! job transition 3 12 6 21
with job ! unemployment transition 1 13 1 15
b) Right-censored durations only 575 1407 781 2763
c) Both left- and right-censored durations 20 41 18 79
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored] 163.637 153.259 154.096 155.677
(std. deviation) (116.23) (118.84) (120.30) (118.76)
Unemployed Agents
Uncensored observations (u ! j transition) 37 49 13 99
Mean time spell between two states [job duration] 19.595 22.429 10.538 19.808
(std. deviation) (14.35) (26.72) (12.22) (21.41)
Censored observations
a) Left-censored durations (u ! j transition) only 1 2 - 3
b) Right-censored durations only: 106 89 24 219
c) Both left- and right-censored durations 8 5 - 13
Mean time spell [both uncensored and censored] 40.974 32.310 24.270 35.362
(std. deviation) (36.37) (31.90) (23.07) (33.61)
¤ Duration data in Months
25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Data
Skills
Full
Low Medium High Sample
Labour Costs
Sample Minimum 734. 1038. 1646. 734.
Mean Cost 4431 (1417) 5245 (1903) 6950 (2642) 5554 (2258)
Sample Maximum 12057. 17348. 20523. 20523.
Net Wages
Sample Minimum 604. 635. 952. 604.
Mean Wage 2472 (809) 2880 (1083) 3967 (1667) 3101 (1356)
Sample Maximum 6878. 9524. 11534. 11534.
density of both net wages and labor costs of the low-skilled are more peaked at its' leftmost
part of the support than those of the higher skills. Also mean net wage of high-skilled
workers amounts to DM 3967 which exceeds that of medium-skilled by 27% and of low-
skilled by more then 37%. Labor costs are roughly the same across the skills and almost
double the net wage.
Finally, comparing the duration statistics for the full sample with that of Bontemps
et al. (2000) we can see that both West German and French data are of about the same
magnitude.
4.2 Estimation Results: Fit of the Model
First we estimate the model with identical employers setting o® with the constant returns
assumption (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). When doing so, we also ¯t the original
Burdett-Mortensen model with no productivity dispersion to compare it with the results
provided by our extension.12 It turns out that the structural parameters estimated with
both original model and our extension with constant-returns speci¯cation do not sig-
12For the sake of brevity here and henceforward we do not report the estimates from the original
Burdett-Mortensen model.
26ni¯cantly di®er from each other. This implies that from the empirical perspective the
sole introduction of skill di®erences does not improve the estimates of search frictions.
Predicted theoretical o®er and labor costs densities (Figures A.3-4 respectively) for the
extended theoretical model with constant returns production function have two jumps
at the reservation wages of the medium- and high-skilled workers and two spikes at the
maximum wages of the low- and medium-skilled workers. This generates a \quasi"-falling
right tail of the aggregate density despite that skill-speci¯c ones are strictly increasing.
However, even with large I the model with constant returns has limited potential of ¯tting
the data.
The ¯t of the model improves when we relax the assumption of a constant returns
production technology (the second column in Table A.1). Along with statistically sig-
ni¯cant increasing returns to scale we ¯nd that, when inserted into the unemployment
equation (3), the estimates of ·i and ± match the observed skill-speci¯c unemployment
rates closer. Though the most interesting result is displayed in Figures A.3-4 where we see
that increasing returns imply the o®er and labor costs densities with strictly decreasing
right tails even in absence of productivity dispersion. Even though the predicted labor
costs density is still too °at pointing towards existence of employer heterogeneity in the
data, this result alone is already remarkable.
The initial unrestricted estimates of the model with variable returns to scale and iden-
tical employers do not meet the \no mass point condition" of Proposition 4. Therefore the
results reported in the second column of Table A.1 are those obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function subject to (24). Furthermore we restrict pro¯ts to be non-negative. It
turns out that at the constrained maximum the condition in (24) is not binding. However,
the non-negativity of pro¯ts is violated on the upper end of the o®er distribution. As a
consequence the non-negativity constraint on the ¯rms pro¯t is binding at the maximum.13
Next we estimate the model with employer heterogeneity and constant returns tech-
nology (Table A.2, column one). As before, we also ¯t the original Burdett-Mortensen
model with J = 3. Again, the parameters we get from the original Burdett-Mortensen
model and from our extension with constant returns technologies hardly di®er. Even
though skill multiplicity eventually provides a better ¯t of the predicted labour costs den-
sity, convex spikes and locally increasing right tail still remain the negative feature of the
13From this also follows that the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is unknown.
We report con¯dence intervals based on (23). However, since the true parameters lie on the boundary of
the parameter space, (23) does not provide correct values (see also Section 3.4).
27constant-returns speci¯cation (see Figure A.6). Furthermore, with the constant returns
to scale technologies increasing the number of skill/productivity types leads to steeper
spikes in the predicted theoretical densities.
Allowing for increasing returns once again improves the ¯t of the model considerably.
Though, as in the case with identical ¯rms, the unrestricted MLEs still violate the pro¯t
ranking. Therefore we perform the estimation of the model given (24) and (25). Remark-
able enough, at the restricted maximum the \no mass point condition" of Proposition 4
is again inactive which provides empirical support for the k-percent rule (12). However,
the ranking constraints ¼(wij¡1) < ¼(wij) turn out to be binding. On the one hand,
this might simply be a consequence of the insu±cient heterogeneity of the production
side. On the other hand, this can also be interpreted as an empirical indication of the
restrictiveness of the equal-pro¯t condition among ¯rms of the same productivity type.
For instance, it may be the case that ¯rms di®er in the size of the capital stock which
implies di®erent pro¯t levels even though the technology they use could be the same.14
The estimates of the model with increasing returns and three-point productivity dis-
persion are presented in the second column of Table A.2. Comparing them to the estimates
from the speci¯cation with identical ¯rms and increasing returns technology two important
improvements can be noticed. First, we manage to obtain a better ¯t for the magnitude
of returns to scale in the whole economy. According to our estimates the degree of ho-
mogeneity is 1:04 for the \low-productive" technology, 1:40 for the \medium-productive"
technology and 4:92 for the \high-productive" one. Given the estimated fraction of each
technology [°j ¡ °j¡1] in the economy, these estimates imply the economy-wide returns
to scale at the level of 1:20. This is in line with numerous evidences from the literature
on the estimation of the returns to scale using di®erent types of production functions.
Typical estimates in this literature support the increasing returns hypothesis and range
from about 1:1 to about 1:35 (see FÄ are at al., 1985, Kim, 1992, and Zellner and Ryu, 1998,
and references therein). Second, and even more important, productivity dispersion with
increasing returns technologies leads to much better ¯tting o®er and labor costs densities.
In Figures A.5-6 one can easily see the dominance of the increasing over constant returns
speci¯cation in terms of both shape of the right tail and smoothed out spikes around the
mean.
Finally, Figures A.7-8 present the skill-speci¯c components of the aggregate o®er and
14A similar possibility of violating the productivity ranking in the original Burdett-Mortensen model
with employer heterogeneity is discussed by Bowlus et al. (1995), p.S127.
28labour costs densities. As expected, for every higher skill level, they mirror the rightward
shift of the probability of getting a better o®er.
4.3 Estimation Results: Social Returns to Education
We use our estimation results to investigate whether the education level in the economy
is e±cient, i.e. whether the social return to education measured by the increase in output
resulting from educating the marginal individual (that is indi®erent between acquiring
the skill levels i ¡ 1 and i) equals the private return of the marginal individual.
Following Grout (1984), who discusses the hold-up problem as a potential source of
underinvestment, Acemoglu (1996) and Masters (1998) develop models where underin-
vestment results from the fact that search or matching frictions make it impossible for
workers to capture the whole return on their investment. However, there can also be over-
investment in our model, because the assumption of skill-segmented labor markets makes
it possible that a lower unemployment rate among high skilled workers can increase the
return to human capital investment to such a degree that workers overinvest in skills.15
To be able to investigate the question of whether there is over- or underinvestment, we
¯rst analyze the social planner's problem who has to allocate each individual to a speci¯c
skill level. Since we assume that workers are risk neutral, the distribution of income does
not matter for the aggregate welfare function. Thus, the social planner maximizes total
output produced by all ¯rms minus the aggregate cost of education.
Aggregate output is obtained by integrating from the ¯rm o®ering the reservation wage
schedule, i.e. Fi1 (wr
i) = 0, to the ¯rm o®ering the maximum wage to all skill groups, i.e.
FiJ (wi) = 1. Since our theoretical model predicts that each ¯rm's labor input is uniquely






Given that the individual cost ci;a of acquiring skill level i is inversely related to ability
a, i.e. ci;a = ci=a, and that the skill speci¯c component ci is increasing in the skill level,
i.e. ci > ci¡1, the social planer will ask high ability workers to acquire a high skill level
and low ability workers to acquire a low skill level. Given the ability distribution H (a)
among individuals on the support a 2 [a;a] with a > 0 the social planer will divide the
population into separated ability segments such that the measure of workers with skill
15This is due to the assumption of segmented labor markets for all skill groups. If we assumed a constant
arrival rate across all unemployed workers, the theoretical model would predict underinvestment.
29i is given by qi = m[H (ai+1) ¡ H (ai)], where ai equals the lowest ability type in skill
group i with a1 = a and aI+1 = a. Thus, choosing the ability type worker ai is identical
to choosing the measure qi of workers with skill i. The average cost of education incurred
by the individuals that the social planner asks to acquire skill level i is given by


























s.t. qi = m[H (ai+1) ¡ H (ai)] 8 i 2 I,
I X
i=1
qi = m, a1 = a, aI+1 = a











= (ci ¡ ci¡1)=a
S
i 8 i 2 I,
i.e. the social welfare is maximized if the cost the marginal individual incurs equals the
output-increase generated by all ¯rms.16
Denote the measure of any adjacent skill groups by ni so that ni = qi +qi¡1. It is easy
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Furthermore, we assume that the skill-speci¯c components ci are such that a solution to the social
planner's problem exists.
























In order to see whether the social returns from educating an individual to a higher skill
level exceed the private returns of doing so, we proceed comparing the marginal increase
in output caused by a change in the skill structure with the private return the marginal
individual gets from acquiring this skill level.
In equilibrium it has to be true that the marginal worker is exactly indi®erent between
the two skill groups, i.e. Ui = Ui¡1. Thus, using (1a), the private return to educating
oneself from the \low" to the \high" level can be written as











1 + r=± + ·e ¹ Fi¡1(w)
dw
= (ci ¡ ci¡1)=a
I
i. (27)
Note, that (27) refers to the optimal decision of unemployed individual, which implies
that the net wages wr
i and wi { not the wage costs { are the bounds of the distribution
of the net o®er. Therefore in order to compute the correct private returns we have to
translate the estimated cuto® wages expressed in terms of labor costs into the cuto® wages
expressed in terms of net wages. Finally, drawing on the OECD statistics, the average
real interest rate over the considered period of 1984-2001 is equal to 3.6%.17
We use the estimates of the structural parameters to evaluate (26)-(27) and see whether
the present skill structure is e±cient. In doing so, we consider two cases, namely:
1. Marginal shift from Medium to High skills (the fraction of low-skilled is constant),
2. Marginal shift from Low to Medium skills (the fraction of high-skilled is constant).
Taking the ¯rst case, the marginal increase of the fraction of high-skilled workers by
educating the marginal medium-skilled worker induces an output increase of DM 2269:88.
At the same time, the period private return of the investment into high skills amounts
to DM 2277:60. Thus, the fraction of high-skilled workers almost precisely matches its'
socially optimal level.
For the next case, however, the result is di®erent. The output e®ect of the marginal
change of the skill structure towards increasing the share of medium-skilled workers in
17Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No.77. Price base for the calculation is set to 1998, as that of the
earnings data.
31the economy is again positive and, although somewhat smaller in its value, amounts to
DM 2057:27. But the private return of investing into medium skills lies at the level of
DM 821:67, which is less than half of the social return. Thus we obtain strong evidence
of underinvestment in skills at the low-to-medium level and conclude that subsidizing the
education of the low-skilled must be welfare improving from the social prospective. Going
back to the de¯nition of skills this means that it would be socially optimal to reduce
the fraction of workers with inadequate or general elementary training and increase the
fraction of those with middle-vocational training.
Although, we are able to provide new insights of whether there is over- or underin-
vestment in an economy, our framework does not allow us to determine the source of the
ine±ciency. The detected underinvestment could either be caused by the hold-up problem
that workers face when making their investment decision or by a positive human capital
externality due to an education spillover.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper extends the search equilibrium model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) by in-
troducing di®erent skill groups and linking them via a production function which permits
any degree of homogeneity. With increasing returns to scale we are able to generate a
decreasing wage o®er density. Allowing for heterogeneity leads to further improvement of
the shape of the wage o®er and earnings distributions predicted by the model. Another
important result of the extended model is that local monopsony power of ¯rms and com-
plementarity of skills in the production function imply that ¯rms occupy the same position
in the wage o®er distribution for each skill group. This fact makes our theory consistent
with the empirical ¯ndings that wages of workers of di®erent skill groups employed at the
same ¯rm are positively correlated.
We apply our model to learn whether there is over- or underinvestment in human
capital in Germany. Our results show that the private return of the investment of a low
skilled worker to become medium skilled is only half of the social return of such a marginal
change in the skill structure. This suggests that social returns to education exceed private
returns and that a policy designed to promote education at lower levels would be welfare
improving. At the same time the number of high-skilled workers is found to be close to
the socially e±cient level.
32REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., \A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns to Human Capital
Accumulation", Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996).
Acemoglu, D., and R., Schimer, \Holdups and E±ciency with Search Frictions",
International Economic Review 40 (1999), 827-849.
Andrews, D., \Inconsistency of the Bootstrap when a Parameter is on the Boundary
of the Parameter Space", Econometrica 68 (2000), 399-405.
Barth, E., and H., Dale Olsen, \Skill-Group Size and Wages", New Zealand Eco-
nomic Papers 36 (2002), 83-84.
Barth, E., and H., Dale Olsen, \Assortative Matching in the Labor Market",
mimeo, Institute for Social Research, Norway (2003).
Bontemps, C., J.-M., Robin, and G.J., van den Berg, \An Empirical Equilibrium
Job Search Model with Search on the Job and Heterogenous Workers and Firms",
International Economic Review 40 (1999), 1039-1075.
Bontemps, C., J.-M., Robin, and G.J., van den Berg, \Equilibrium Search with
Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Estimation", International Economic Review
41 (2000), 305-358.
Bowlus, A., Kiefer, N., and G., Neumann, \Estimation of Equilibrium Wage Dis-
tributions with Heterogeneity", Journal of Applied Econometrics 10 (1995), S119-
S131.
Bowlus, A., Kiefer, N., and G., Neumann, \Equilibrium Search Models and the
Transition from School to Work", International Economic Review 42 (2001), 317-
343.
Bowlus, A., and Z., Eckstein, \Discrimination and Skill Di®erences in an Equilib-
rium Search Model", International Economic Review 43 (2002), 1309-1346.
Burdett, K., and D.T., Mortensen, \Wage Di®erentials, Employer Size and Un-
employment", International Economic Review 39 (1998), 257-273.
33Chernozhukov, V., and H., Hong, \Likelihood Estimation and Inference in a Class
of Nonregular Econometric Models", Econometrica 72 (2004), 1445-1480.
Diamond, P., \A Model of Price Adjustment", Journal of Economic Theory 3 (1971),
156-168.
FÄ are, R., Jansson, L., and K., Lovell \Modelling Scale Economies with Ray-
Homothetic Production Functions", Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (1985),
624-629.
Grout, P., \Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash
Bargaining Approach", Econometrica 52 (1984), 449-460.
Katz, L., and L., Summers, \Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1989), 209-275.
Kiefer, N.M., and G.R., Neumann, \Wage Dispersion with Homogeneity: The
Empirical Equilibrium Search Model", in H. Bunzel et al., eds., Panel Data and
Labor Market Analysis, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1993).
Kim, Y., \Translog Production Functions and Variable Returns to Scale", Review of
Economics and Statistics 74 (1992), 546-552.
Koning, P., G., Ridder, and G.J., van den Berg, \Structural and Frictional Un-
employment in an Equilibrium Search Model with Heterogeneous Agents", Journal
of Applied Econometrics 10 (1995), 133-151.
Manning, A., \Monopsony in Motion", (Princeton University Press, 2003).
Masters, A., \E±ciency of Investment in Human and Physical Capital in a Model of
Bilateral Search and Bargaining", International Economic Review 39 (1998), 477-
494.
McDonald, J., \Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income",
Econometrica 52 (1984), 647-663.
Mortensen, D.T., \Equilibrium Wage Distribution: a Synthesis", in J. Hartog et al.,
eds., Panel Data and Labor Market Studies, (Amsterdam: North Holland 1990).
34Mortensen, D.T., \Modelling Matched Job-Worker Flows", mimeo (1999).
Mortensen, D.T., \Equilibrium Unemployment with Wage Posting: Burdett-Mortensen
Meet Pissarides", in H., Bunzel et al., eds., Panel Data and Structural labor Market
Models (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000).
Mortensen, D.T., and G.R., Neuman, \Estimating Structural Models of Unem-
ployment and Job Duration", in W.A., Barnett et al., eds., Dynamic Econometric
Modelling, Proceedings of the Third International Symposium in Economic Theory
and Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Postel-Vinay, F., and J.-M., Robin, \Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker
and Employer Heterogeneity", Econometrica 70 (2002), 2295-2350.
Saint-Paul, G., \Unemployment and Increasing Private Returns to Human Capital",
Jouranl of Public Economics 61 (1996), 1-20.
Singh, S., and G., Maddala, \A Function for Size Distribution of Income", Econo-
metrica 44 (1976), 963-970.
van den Berg, G.J., and G., Ridder, \An Empirical Equilibrium Search Model of
the Labor Market", Econometrica 66 (1998), 1183-1221.
VDR, \Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen", DRV-Schrift, Band 22, Frankfurt am Main
(2004).
Zellner, A., and H., Ryu, \Alternative Functional Forms for Production, Cost and
Returns to Scale Functions", Journal of Applied Econometrics 13 (1998), 101-127.
35APPENDIX
Figure A.1: \Kernel Estimates of Net Earnings Densities"












Figure A.2: \Kernel Estimates of Labour Cost Densities"

















36Table A.1: \Estimation Results: Homogeneous Firms"
Speci¯cation
Constant Returns ¤ Increasing Returns
·u1 4:6182 [4:1640; 5:0725] 5:9115 [5:2372; 6:5858]
·u2 8:2312 [7:6093; 8:8531] 10:4875 [9:5566; 11:4183]
·u3 14:1192 [12:5421; 15:6963] 17:8712 [15:4814; 20:2611]
·e 0:1605 [0:1421; 0:1789] 2:0963 [1:7342; 2:4585]
± 0:0066 [0:063; 0:0068] 0:0043 [0:0041; 0:0045]




¤Here and henceforward 95% con¯dence intervals in square brackets
37Figure A.3: \Aggregate Wage O®er Densities: Homogeneous Firms"











Theoretical Offer Density − Constant Returns
Theoretical Offer Density − Increasing Returns
Empirical Earnings Density
Figure A.4: \Aggregate Labour Costs Densities: Homogeneous Firms"











Theoretical Labour Costs Density − Constant Returns  
Theoretical Labour Costs Density − Increasing Returns
Empirical Labour Costs Density                       
38Table A.2: \Estimation Results: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity"
Speci¯cation
Constant Returns Increasing Returns
·u1 5:6156 [4:9973; 6:2339] ·u1 5:9612 [5:2742; 6:6481]
·u2 9:9702 [9:1169; 10:8234] ·u2 10:6176 [9:6662; 11:5691]
·u3 17:0121 [14:8258; 19:1985] ·u3 18:0656 [15:6320; 20:4991]
·e 2:1277 [1:9869; 2:2684] ·e 3:6432 [3:3926; 3:8939]
± 0:0047 [0:0045; 0:0049] ± 0:0042 [0:0040; 0:0044]
»1 1:0381 [1:0324; 1:0437]
»2 1:3961 [1:2977; 1:4945]
»3 4:9201 [3:1342; 6:7060]
f®ijg j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 f®ijg j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
i = 1 0:1772 0:1449 0:1499 i = 1 0:1896 0:2466 0:9822
i = 2 0:4622 0:4939 0:5212 i = 2 0:4850 0:6586 2:4929
fwijg j = 1 j = 2 fwijg j = 1 j = 2
i = 1 4431 5698 i = 1 4431 5698
i = 2 5065 7597 i = 2 5065 6964
i = 3 6964 9992 i = 3 6964 9992
j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2
°j 0:7905 0:9610 °j 0:8485 0:9685
ln(L) ¡65059:96 ln(L) ¡64843:50
39Figure A.5: \Aggregate Wage O®er Densities: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity"











Theoretical Offer Density − Constant Returns
Theoretical Offer Density − Inreasing Returns
Empirical Earnings Density
Figure A.6: \Aggregate Labour Costs Densities: 3-Point Employer Heterogeneity"








Theoretical Labour Costs Density − Constant Returns 
Theoretical Labour Costs Density − Inreasing Returns
Empirical Labour Costs Density                      
40Figure A.7: \3-Point Employer Heterogeneity: Skill-Speci¯c Theoretical O®er Densities"














Figure A.8: \3-Point Employer Heterogeneity: Skill-Speci¯c Theoretical Labour Costs
Densities"

















41Proof of Proposition 5.
De¯ne
hj (w) =
[± + ¸e (1 ¡ °j¡1)]
2
£
± + ¸eF j (w)
¤2 , rij =
±¸i (± + ¸e)













The second order Taylor expansion of the production function around rj is given by








i ¾ij [hj (w) ¡ 1]
2 .
Note, that hj (w) is independent of the skill group i, because of equation (12). Using the
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According to the result that all ¯rms occupy the same position in all wage o®er distri-
bution, changing the wage for one skill group implies a change of all other wages in the
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Using a Taylor-Expansion for the ¯rst derivative of the production function and substi-
tuting ll (wl) out gives
Y
0







(rljhj (w) ¡ rlj).
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Apart from this, a special case appears if
¡
Y 0
j (rj) ¡ wij
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Y 0




This solution, however, implies arti¯cial restrictions on »j, so its consideration is neither
interesting nor useful.
Otherwise, we get the following solution for the quadratic function
hj (w) = ¡
¡
Y 0
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¢2 + 4(¾ij ¡ ¹ij)
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@Fij(w) > 0, it follows that 2(¾ij ¡ ¹ij)hj (w) +
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Y 0
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¢
rij ¡ ¾ij > 0. (A.5)


















In order to see that the wage o®er density can be increasing and decreasing consider the


























































Thus, a necessary condition for the wage o®er density to be upward sloping is that
¡
Y 0
j (rj) ¡ wi
¢
rij ¡ ¾ij > 0. Substituting ¾ij, and using the Euler Theorem gives the
stated condition.
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